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2.1.1 The Wallace and Zhu (2003) modelAbstract
We build on our earlier model of moneyin which bank liabilities circulate as medium
of exchange, and investigate the provision of liquidity for a range of central-bank reg-
ulations dealing with the potential of bank failure. In our model, banks issue inside
money under fractional reserves, facing the event of excess redemptions. They monitor
the ﬂoat of their money issue and make reserve-management decisions which aﬀect
aggregate liquidity conditions. Numerical examples demonstrate bank failure when re-
turns to banking are low. Central-bank interventions, injecting more funds or making
interest payments proportional to holdings of reserves, may improve banks’ returns and
society’s welfare, followed by a reduction in bank failure.
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JEL classification: E4, E5
Keywords: private money creation, liquidityIn this paper, we present an approach that incorporates banking into random-matching
models of money. We believe that our model provides a useful framework in which one can
study the connection between the provision of inside money, the velocity of bank liabilities,
and the regulatory environment determining the proﬁtability of the banking industry.
We model banking in a random-matching environment by assuming that a fraction of
the population is no longer anonymous. We assume that a subset of the agents, our banks,
can be monitored to some degree and are able to issue substitutes to government currency
or outside money. The velocity of these substitutes, the private money, is endogenous, and
depends on the regulation faced by banks. Their behavior concerning money creation is also
important and, in turn, it depends on their short-term and long-term payoﬀs. Our model
does allow for excess redemptions of liabilities, with occasional bank failure. As a result, we
are able to measure to what extent the private provision of liquidity and the resulting bank
illiquidity promote trade and monetary stability.
We compute examples in which banks face a variety of regulations, resulting in diﬀerent
levels of liquidity. Our results also provide insights on some interesting events in monetary
history. Overall, they support the old view that a system of privately created liquidity can
be self-stabilizing. For example, in one conﬁguration of our model, we ﬁnd that banks may
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focus on short-run returns only and eventually fail. Finally, in a case of a liquidity shortage,
some infusion of reserves by a central bank may, through general-equilibrium eﬀects on the
proﬁtability of private banks, lead to an increase in trade and a reduction of bank failure.
One could view a bank, at a particular date in our model, as a coalition between a
productive enterprise and a ﬁnancial institution, so that the liabilities of the pair constitute
ad e v i c ef o rﬁnancing productive investments, in the same way that bills of exchange were
seen in monetary history. The fact that these liabilities are eventually redeemed gives real
value to these promises. We have emphasized the role of banking returns and of aggregate
liquidity conditions governing banking activity.
In our model, banks can be proﬁtable without earning interests on reserves, since the
capability to create liquidity has private beneﬁts. We study whether a stable monetary
system emerges, as well as whether there is underissue or overissue of notes, and whether




Working Paper Series No. 394
September 20041I n t r o d u c t i o n
Monetary theory and macroeconomics have a common history, including a generation of
Walrasian models in which notions of liquidity were restricted to measures of a single mone-
tary aggregate. Competitive models are simple to work with, mainly because they abstract
from the mechanics for “who trades what and with whom.” There are, however, important
consequences from ignoring how banks and other private institutions create liquidity.1 In
the Kareken and Wallace (1980) volume, a landmark for models of that generation, Tobin
(1980) expresses the concern that a model ﬁxing the velocity of money exogenously “...evades
all the macroeconomic issues that hinge on the endogenous variation of velocity, questions
which involve in turn the menu of money substitutes provided by government or by private
agents and intermediaries.”
In this paper, we present an alternative approach, incorporating banking into random-
matching models of money. We believe that our model provides a useful framework in
which one can study the connection between the provision of inside money, the velocity of
bank liabilities, and the regulatory environment determining the proﬁtability of the banking
industry.
1In this paper, liquidity creation refers to the ability of banks to generate a higher volume of welfare
improving trade through the issue of private money.
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to demonstrate that truly private liquidity provision requires a notion of bank liabilities,
illiquidity and, to some extent, failure. Otherwise, this liquidity provision can be achieved
with outside money,w i t h o u ta n yb e n e ﬁts associated to inside money. We model banking
in a random-matching environment by assuming that a fraction of the population is no
longer anonymous. We assume that a subset of the agents, our banks, can be monitored
to some degree and are able to issue substitutes to government currency or outside money.
The velocity of these substitutes, the private money, is endogenous, and depends on the
regulation faced by banks. Their behavior concerning money creation is also important and,
in turn, it depends on their short-term and long-term payoﬀs. Our model does allow for
excess redemptions of liabilities, with occasional bank failure. As a result, we are able to
measure to what extent the private provision of liquidity and the resulting bank illiquidity
promote trade and monetary stability.
We compute examples in which banks face a variety of regulations, resulting in diﬀerent
levels of liquidity. Our results also provide insights on some interesting events in monetary
history. Overall, they support the old view that a system of privately created liquidity can
be self-stabilizing. For example, in one conﬁguration of our model, we ﬁnd that banks may
stop creating money despite its private beneﬁts in the short run. We also ﬁnd instances,
however, in which banks may give up trying to reverse their illiquid position. They instead
The presentation of our model is preceded by a review of papers that we ﬁnd useful,
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some infusion of reserves by a central bank may, through general-equilibrium eﬀects on the
proﬁtability of private banks, lead to an increase in trade and a reduction of bank failure.
The paper is organized as follows. We review related models in section 2. There, we
also argue that some of the concepts that we shall concentrate on later, such as reserve
management and ﬂoat, can be described in models without explicit money creation. These
models make use of a linearity property that facilitates the analysis. We present some of
the alternatives allowed by this simpliﬁcation, but show that it is not compatible with the
possibility of bank failure. We then introduce models of inside money, that is, models in which
there is private creation of money. We discuss how, when there is perfect monitoring of banks,
the reserve management problem is likely to disappear, although other important monetary
issues can be studied. One objective of this subsection is to motivate the assumption of
imperfect monitoring that we impose later, which not only allows for reserve management
and for the ﬂoat of notes, but also allows for bank failure. We present our model in section
3. There, we also comment on the existence of steady states as well as on properties of bank
strategies. In section 4, we use numerical methods to document a variety of equilibrium
outcomes. Our conclusion follows. Some proofs appear in the appendix.
9
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Our model builds on the previous work of Cavalcanti, Erosa, and Temzelides (1999), CET for
short. The literature review below is divided between models of banks with outside money,
and those with inside money. Kiyotaki and Wright (1989), a building block of our model,
allows money to take diﬀerent forms, such as currency in ﬁxed supply, and/or commodity
money created privately. More recent models allow for the use of private ﬁat money. As
we show below, private money can sometimes be substituted by outside money without
signiﬁcant changes. In contrast, in our model banks do create liquidity by providing inside
money.
2.1 Outside-money models of banking
We begin by reviewing models of banking in economies where only outside money exists in
ﬁxed supply. The meaning of outside money shall become clear as we proceed.
2.1.1 The Wallace and Zhu (2003) model
Wallace and Zhu (2003), WZ for short, present a model of banknote ﬂoat with divisible
production and weak restrictions on money holdings. In this sense, WZ is a generalization
of CET. Here we present a simpliﬁed version of WZ which ignores these generalizations, but
serves as a critical comparison with inside-money models. The main ﬁndings of this section
are as follows. First, the value function for banks in the WZ model satisﬁes a certain linearity
10
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version of the model without ﬂoat.
Let us consider initially the following standard environment. Time is discrete and the
horizon is inﬁnite. There are k perishable goods per date, all of them indivisible. A measure-
one continuum of individuals inhabit the economy, and they produce and consume either 0
o r1u n i to fag o o dp e rd a t e . I ns e c t i o n3 ,w ea l l o wf o rd e a t h sa n db i r t h s ,b u t f o rn o w ,
let us assume in this section that individuals live forever, and that the common discount
factor is β ∈ (0,1). People specialize in consumption and production. Individuals of type
s consume only good s and produce only good s +1 , modulo k. People cannot commit to
future actions, and their histories are to some extent, to be made precise below, private.
Individuals meet randomly in pairs once per period, and the probability of meeting with a
relevant consumer is the same as meeting with a relevant producer: 1
k, a fraction independent
of s. As is standard, we assume that k>2, so that barter is not possible. We study only
steady states with symmetric allocations with respect to s. I ti st h u sh e l p f u lt oa s s u m e
symmetric preferences: consumption gives an instantaneous utility u, and production gives
a disutility e,w i t hu>e . Restrictions on β will be needed in order to demonstrate that a
monetary steady state exists, but we postpone that discussion until section 3.
The above environment can be used to derive a role for outside money analytically. That
is done by endowing a fraction (of each type) of the population with one unit of ﬁat money,
11
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restricted to either 0 or 1. Here, we consider the following alternative. First, we divide
the population of each type into two sets: the banks, of measure B/k, and the nonbanks,
of measure (1 − B)/k. We assume that banks can hold money in the form of reserves, r,
taking values in the set of integers {0,1,2,...,N}. The parameters B ∈ (0,1) and N>0
may require further restrictions, but they are not important for the discussion that follows.
Unlike WZ, we assume for simplicity that nonbanks can only hold 0 or 1 unit of money. More
importantly, let us assume as WZ do, that banks can issue notes identiﬁe db yt h en a m eo f
the issuer, and that banks never meet other banks. That assumption is modiﬁed in section
3, when the question of whether a bank issues money to another bank is posed explicitly.
The assumption that notes are indexed by the identity of the issuer gives rise to a reserve-
management problem, as a stochastic process resulting from the random trades governs the
ﬂoat of such notes. Formal studies of reserve management date back to Edgeworth (1888) and
have been formulated as a partial-equilibrium decision problem of a bank taken in isolation.
Informal discussions of how a monetary system can be disciplined by ﬂoat date back to
proponents of the free-banking school and the Law of Reﬂux.2
As in CET, banks build reserves by receiving in trade a note issued by another bank.
When they do so, the reserve balance of the issuer is reduced by one unit, and the reserve
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creased by one unit. We preserve the tractability of the model by assuming that all notes
are treated the same way by the nonbank population. The next assumption refers to bank
failure. We assume initially, as WZ do, that a severe punishment is applied to banks that
issue more notes than their reserves (this assumption is relaxed in section 3). The state of
ab a n ka tt h es t a r to fap e r i o di s( r,m), where r is total reserves and m is the total number
of notes in the hands of nonbanks. The assumption that a severe punishment for failure is
enforceable corresponds to imposing m ≤ r because a bank in state (r,r) stops issuing notes
for all r.
Once the number, m, of a bank’s notes in circulation is bound by their current r,w h y
should banks care about their ﬂoat; that is, about how long notes stay in circulation? We
assume, as WZ do, that a central bank or government pays interest R on each unit of reserves
held per period, with R>0. Hence the total payment of interests is proportional to the
length of time during which a note stays in circulation. (In section 3, banks care about
ﬂoat as a result of the possibility of failure, even if R =0 ,a sr<mis allowed). A key
property of the WZ model is that it allows the interest to be paid in units of a common
good, with a linear utility schedule, without adding much complexity to the model. That
linearity also facilitates the reduction of the state space of the economy, as we shall discuss
13
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random meetings take place, and that such transfers are ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax not
modeled explicitly. We also ignore, in this simpliﬁed version, other taxes and clearing fees
that WZ consider.
We let pn
0 denote the measure of nonbanks holding 0 notes, divided by k,a n dl e tpn
1
denote the measure of nonbanks holding 1 note of some bank, also divided by k.A l s o w e
let pb
r,m denote the measure of banks holding r reserves and facing a current liability m
in the beginning of the ﬁrst sub-period, divided by k. A monetary steady state requires
these measures to be time invariant, and that nonbanks trade for notes. We also postpone
until section 3 a complete description of these stationarity restrictions. For the moment,
we let φr,m denote the probability that banks choose, as a contingent strategy, to issue a
note in exchange for consumption, and let γr,m denote that probability of acquiring a note in
exchange for production. Because nonbanks do not receive interest on holdings in the second
sub-period, the parameter R i sn o tr e l e v a n tf o rt h e m ;t h u s ,t h e i rv a l u e sc a nb es i m p l ys t a t e d
as
3In Wallace and Zhu (2003), nonbanks are allowed to hold multiple units of money, and thus a bank
may transfer more than one note to a nonbank. The linearity assumption is helpful in that it simpliﬁes the







































1 is the discounted expected utility of starting with one note, and vn
0 is that of
starting without a note.
Before presenting the values for banks, we shall state another assumption that simpliﬁes
the prediction of ﬂoats. As in WZ, we assume now that nonbanks holding a note and meeting
with a bank agree to swap their holdings by new notes issued by the bank. By assumption,
nonbanks are indiﬀerent about this swap, and banks can use the notes in order to increase
reserves and earn interests on ﬂoat. As a result, the probability that a note held by a nonbank
gets retired from circulation, call it π, equals the probability of meeting with a bank, B.4 In
addition, we assume that a bank meets with a nonbank with probability 1 − B,a n dm e e t s
nobody with probability B. The values for banks thus satisfy
4In section 3 we do not allow swaps, as if swapping would place a small cost or risk to nonbanks. Even
if swaps were allowed, however, the probability π would no longer be exogenous since banks are allowed to
fail in equilibrium, and a failed bank does not make deposits with the central bank.
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The last term in the right-hand side of the Bellman equation (3), for vb
r,m, corresponds to the
increase in ﬂoat due to the swap of a note. We use the superscript j on the expected utility
from the clearing process wj
r,m to indicate whether the increase in ﬂo a ti sd u et oan o t ei s s u e d
in the current period (j = 1). The indicator is important as a note issued in the current
period cannot be cleared instantaneously since, in the WZ model, banks do not issue notes
to other banks. As stated above, a bank meeting with a nonbank holding a note can at least
engage in a note swap with payoﬀ w1
r+1,m+1. If, in addition, the nonbank is also a potential
consumer, an event of probability pn
1, then the bank chooses, with probability γr,m,t oa d dt h e
expected utility (−e+w0
r+1,m −w1
r+1,m+1) to his value. Also, as stated above, the stochastic
process governing notes is a binomial distribution with parameter π. As discussed, π is
exogenous in the present formulation, but the binomial distribution governing the clearing
16
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on reserves not used or set aside for backing notes in circulation. The formulation is thus
one in which such payments aﬀect utility separably, since central banks can transfer units of
a common (second sub-period) good to banks.
Thus, this simpliﬁed version of the WZ model is a model in which a central bank aﬀects
banking decisions through policies of interest payments on reserves. Bank decisions, in turn,
aﬀect how much money is put in circulation and, if production were divisible, how much
output would be traded, on average, for a unit of money (that is, nominal prices). We now
call attention to the fact that the central bank does not allow banks to create money in the
WZ model. Related to this is the fact that the central bank is not allowing banks to become
illiquid and to risk failure. As a result, the WZ model has an outside-money interpretation.
We make that interpretation explicit by presenting a related model where the ﬂoat of notes
is removed. Instead, impersonal outside-money is used in trades. The next proposition
discusses the linearity property of vb
r,m.
Proposition 1 Given strategies (φ,γ), there exists a unique value function vb solving the
Bellman equation for banks. Moreover, for i such that vb
r+i,m+i is well deﬁned, vb satisﬁes
the following linearity condition: vb
r+i,m+i = vb
r,m + Ai,w h e r eA is a positive constant.
This linearity property can be used to deﬁne an alternative banking arrangement, attain-
ing the same indivisible-goods allocation as that in WZ. To demonstrate this, we proceed
17
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consider a regulation or central-bank policy that attaches to each bank, as a single state
variable, a natural number g.T h es t a t eg, for “gold,” represents net holdings (or wealth),
the diﬀerence r − m in the original formulation. In order to induce the same behavior in
random meetings as before, we assume that in the second sub-period, R units of the com-
mon good are paid per unit of holdings, with gR being paid in total. Next, we demonstrate
the equivalence between the WZ economy and an economy with only outside money. We
remove swaps of money, and assume that when money is spent in the ﬁrst sub-period the
balance g is reduced by one unit, and when money is accepted from a nonbank the balance
g is increased by one unit. It is clear that the proposed simpliﬁcation treats all money use
as if it generated no ﬂoat, that is, as if notes issued are redeemed in the same period. We
compensate this absence of ﬂo a tw i t hap a y m e n to f ¯ R units of the second sub-period good
whenever money is used (that is, whenever g is reduced). By choosing ¯ R a c c o r d i n gt ot h e
expected forgone interest payments on ﬂoat,






w ea r ea b l et og e n e r a t et h es a m eb a n kd e c i s i ons. It is important to remark that, in the
original formulation, a bank in (r,m) expects the same payment due to ﬂoats generated
by new swaps as another bank in any (r0,m 0). Thus, the payoﬀ associated to swaps is
independent of the current state of a bank, so that the transfers in the second sub-period,
18
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We formalize this outside-money economy as follows. With a certain abuse of notation,
the Bellman equations for nonbanks remain the same, except that the pair (r,m) is replaced





g + gR+ p
n












with the understanding that φ0 =0 .
Thus, in this outside-money version, there are no swaps and no explicit ﬂoats. The
proposition relating this no-ﬂoat, outside-money economy to the ﬂoat economy, provided
that (pn
0,p n
1) does not change, is as follows.
Proposition 2 If (φr,m,γr,m) is an optimal strategy in the economy with ﬂoat, then (φg,γg) ≡
(φg,0,γg,0) is an optimal strategy in the economy without ﬂoat.
The main implication of Proposition 2 is that a ﬂoat economy, with an interest-rate on
reserves R, can be duplicated by a no ﬂoat-economy, with interest-rate on money holdings R,
which increases to R+ ¯ R in the last holding period. Thus, the no-ﬂoat economy loses some of
its inside-money interpretation, except that for computing ¯ R, it is necessary to know π,t h e




m+g,m,s i n c e
pb
g must be an invariant distribution implied by (φg,γg), if pb
r,m is an invariant distribution
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0,p n
1) is the same across the two economies.
One of the innovations of the WZ model is to allow a straightforward comparison be-
tween a model of private money and one historical episode in the United States before the
establishment of the Federal Reserve System, the so-called National Banking Era. National
banks were allowed to issue private notes backed by holdings of government bonds. Under
the assumption that collateral requirements did disable money creation, an assumption that
somehow limits the ability of banks to use other resources, like deposits of specie held for their
clients, to ﬁnance bond purchases, the WZ model leads to the conclusion that the system
indeed failed to provide an elastic currency regime.5 Another innovation of the WZ model,
in the presence of certain taxes and fees on clearing, is to call attention to the fact that a
national bank could rationally choose not to issue a note (not to use all available collateral),
whenever the ﬂoat of that note is expected to be too small. The fact that national banks did
not use all available collateral is often called the underissue puzzle. Our version above does
not feature underissue, as we did not include taxes and fees in this overview. As we discuss
later, underissue may occur in CET if a bank, concerned about the possibility of failure,
avoids an m exceeding r. In section 3, we allow meetings among banks, and ask whether
bank behavior varies in these meetings, relative to those with nonbanks, just because the
5Data on reserves held against deposits reveal that nineteenth-century banks in Europe were regularly
illiquid, often with a reserves/deposits ratio lower than one third. Under those conditions, a collateral
requirement for backing notes would place note holders ahead of depositors in a bankruptcy line, but need
not remove illiquidity or the risk of failure.
former generate no ﬂoat.
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He, Huang and Wright (2003), HHW for short, propose a model in which gold coins can be
lost to theft in random meetings, but notes cannot. They assume that there is an abstract
(exogenous) cost in maintaining each unit of note in circulation, which, however, does not
apply to gold. The analysis is further extended to allow an endogenous choice between
productive and theft activities in random meetings. As a result, a coexistence of gold and
notes might arise.
The HHW model thus oﬀers insights about the circulation of alternative media of ex-
change when their physical attributes diﬀer. Such diﬀerences are not the focus of our paper,
but there is a section in HHW discussing fractional reserves that merits a comparison with
our outside-money version of the WZ model. In the HHW model, banks only meet with
nonbanks in what would be the second sub-period, the afternoon, of the WZ model. A bank
in the HHW model is in essence a technology for issuing notes, with linear circulation costs,
and with an exogenous bound (a “multiplier”) on the ratio of notes issued to gold stored.
Nonbanks holding a gold coin can obtain a note from the bank after paying a deposit fee of
the afternoon good, with a linear utility schedule. Nonbanks without coins can also obtain
an o t eb yp a y i n gal o a nf e eo ft h es a m eg o o d .A s a result, there is a limit to the creation
of outside money given by the requirement of fractional reserves of gold. In terms of our
21
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costs of maintaining note circulation (which must be incurred every period and for every
note), the random-meetings transactions could be carried by notes only, freeing society from
theft.6
Our point is that outside-money arrangements do not preclude the possibility of injections
of money in the economy. Those injections, done in the afternoon, do not create bank
illiquidity in any signiﬁcant way. They just promote a redistribution of money holdings, in
the same way that inﬂa t i o nd o e si nw e l l - k n o w ns t u d i e so ft h ew e l f a r ec o s t so fi n ﬂation in
random-matching models of money.7 The HHW model can, however, be used as a benchmark
for models that introduce a market in which nonbanks can participate, and where outside
money is injected. Next, we discuss an outline of an extension of the WZ model in which
such a market is deﬁned, but without explicit references to fractional reserves in gold.
Let us consider again the basic setup of the WZ model presented above, and let us assume
that a centralized meeting takes place in each second sub-period, call it afternoon, and that
nonbanks without money can also participate in these afternoon meetings. Now both banks
6One way in which this arrangement could potentially be supported, even with circulation costs, would
be through the use of lump-sum taxes, which, however, was not considered in their paper.
7The study of inﬂation, under the assumption of a unit upper bound on holdings, is done assuming that
monetary injections reach some individuals without money, followed by a lump-sum tax in the form of a
probability that a money holder loses his money. We avoid presenting the details here, but one could assume
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of the goods. Let us assume further that a central bank intervenes in a market for the
creation of money in the following way. Each nonbank in this market has the option to pay
ρ, in units of the afternoon good, in exchange for one note. Notes issued to nonbanks in the
afternoon must come from a new supply of L reserves issued by the central bank to banks
willing to participate in this market. Each bank transfers θ units of the afternoon good per
unit of new reserves received, as well as a note that is given to a nonbank. The central bank,
thus, collects (ρ + θ)L with this intervention.
Are there values for (L,R,ρ,θ) consistent with monetary steady states? One contribution
of the HHW model is that the linearity of the payoﬀs for banks and nonbanks may produce
a tractable way of determining (R,ρ,θ) endogenously, given measures of outside money and
of money injection L. We could perhaps require that in equilibrium ρ = β(vn
1 −vn
0), so that
L is demanded, and that θ is given by the linear payoﬀ ¯ R of the WZ model, so that banks
agree to an interior supply of funds.
In other words, the HHW structure of two periods, allowing nonbank participation in
the second period, can be used to deﬁne a market for notes in simple terms. The prices
supporting a zero supply of notes in this market (L = 0), for instance, are given by θ = ¯ R
and ρ = β(vn
1 − vn
0), deﬁned by the equilibrium values of the WZ model.
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The model described by Williamson (1999), explores other properties of linear payoﬀs. Like
the original HHW model, it allows an aggregation of returns in such a way that the bank
sector can be represented by a single bank.
Starting with the HHW model, assume now that nonbanks holding money are also al-
lowed to join the centralized market in the afternoon. In addition, one can assume that
the production of afternoon goods requires some investment time, so that the output of the
current production is only available for consumption in the afternoon of the next period.
The centralized market can thus perform an investment function, so that one can explore
implications of note issue being backed by investment goods. Williamson (1999) in fact
adds more features to this description, such as the possibility that nonbanks invest in au-
tarky, diﬀerent types of investment projects, asymmetric information about project types,
and a stochastic maturity proﬁle for investment projects. Chang (1999), in his discussion of
Williamson’s paper, argues that the crucial feature in the model allowing notes to circulate,
possibly in competition to government money, is the promise of future redemption that is
implicitly made by the investment sector.
One question that is not addressed explicitly by Williamson (1999) or Chang (1999) is
whether outside money can support the same allocations as banknotes in the model. Since
the centralized market can sell the matured goods arising from investments completed in the
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that in a steady state all money brought to the market by nonbank consumers is paid out to
nonbank producers. Williamson (1999) assumes that banks, or the centralized market in our
description, only takes notes issued by the banks themselves and do not accept government
currency as payment. This discussion suggests, however, that such an assumption is an
inessential part of his model, and that in principle, banks need not care whether a particular
means of payment was issued by the government or by another bank, as long as that asset
is accepted as reserves by the central bank and can be used to support note issue and other
bank activities in the future.
2.2 Inside-money models of banking
We now review models that in contrast to WZ, HHW and Williamson (1999), cannot be
described as outside-money economies.
2.2.1 The Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999) model
The main question of the mechanism-design approach of Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999b),
C Wf o rs h o r t ,i sw h e t h e rb a n k i n gi sar o b u s ti n s titution in the context of random-matching
models of money. They build on the divisible-goods environment of Shi (1995) and Trejos
and Wright (1999). Since these are standard models of outside money, embedding them into
a model of banking makes it easier to document the robustness of inside money. However,
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indivisible-goods version of CW. We proceed with a brief description in the spirit of Wright
(1999). We return to comments about divisible goods and other extensions of CW later.
Unlike the HHW and Williamson (1999) models, bankers in the CW model are individuals
facing the same trading opportunities as the nonbank public. Also, there are no sub-periods
with common goods as in the WZ structure, so that all bank payoﬀs come from consumption
and production in regular meetings. There are two important points of departure relative to
standard random-matching models of money. First, as far as primitives are concerned, being
a banker is just a label given to individuals that can be monitored. The set of bankers has an
exogenous measure B ∈ [0,1]. When the parameter B is set equal to zero, all individuals are
anonymous, producing the standard model as a particular case. Second, given a nontrivial
measure of banks, CW ask how the set of allocations, resulting when banks are allowed
to issue notes (the inside-money regime), compares with the corresponding set when banks
cannot create notes (the outside-money regime).
The regime comparison in CW is essentially a study of all equilibrium possibilities. Their
approach is to consider the highest punishment allowed by trigger strategies as a device for
controlling bank behavior. They ﬁnd that imposing restrictions on the creation of money
does not aﬀect the nature of participation constraints. As a result, they are able to derive
a straight comparison between inside and outside money: any equilibrium that uses only
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the allocation that maximizes an average-welfare criteria over the set of inside-money allo-
cations, which is an equilibrium (satisfying participation constraints) for some parameters,
cannot be achieved by using outside money.
We use the following notation in order to state these ﬁndings formally. Nonbanks carry
either 0 or 1 unit of notes as before. Money is distributed symmetrically across the k
specialization types according to pn
0 and pn
1,w i t hpn
0 + pn
1 =( 1− B)/k. Depending on the
regime, the state j of a bank has a diﬀerent interpretation, but banks of all types are in
general distributed symmetrically across states according to pb
j,w i t h
P
j pb
j = B/k.L e tu s













where i ∈ {b,n} denotes the type bank/nonbank and j the state of an individual, with
primes used to distinguish the consumer, yii0
jj0 ∈ {0,e} indicating whether the (i,j) potential
producer actually produces for the (i0,j0)c o n s u m e r ,uii0
jj0 = u if yii0
jj0 = e and uii0
jj0 =0
otherwise. It can be shown that the average discounted utility in this simple economy is
proportional to Z since the product pi
jpi0
j0 measures the frequency of the meeting between
the (i,j)p r o d u c e ra n dt h e( i0,j0) consumer, and uii0
jj0 − yii0
jj0 measures the net payoﬀ in this
meeting. Hence the average payoﬀ must be proportional to Z.
27
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 394
September 2004which banks switch states depends on the way they are regulated; in particular, it depends
on whether they can create money. CW deﬁne the outside-money regime as a regulation
forcing banks to only use outside money, like in the WZ model. If banks can only hold 0
or 1 unit of outside money, like the other agents, then the state j for banks can be used
as an index to money holdings. With the objective of maximizing Z, it is a good idea to
have banks producing as often as possible. A desirable allocation has banks producing for
nonbanks even when they cannot pay with money. As Wright (1999) points out, there is
also no need for banks to ask for payment from the nonbanks that do have money. Although
the bank could use the money to buy goods in the future, there is no net gain in terms of Z
because the nonbank would then leave the meeting without this purchasing power. Hence,
a desirable outside-money allocation has the banks producing gifts to nonbanks with and


































8This result, however, does not hold with divisible goods when participation constraints bind.
As usual, nonbanks switch states when they acquire and spend money. The way in
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0 ≥ vn
1, and that for the
nonbank producer is −e+βvn
1 ≥ vn
0, but it is easy to show that the latter implies the former.
As indicated in the Bellman equations for nonbanks, all banks produce for nonbanks
in single-coincidence meetings and, without loss of generality, they do not request money
payments under the outside-money regime. Thus the state j of a bank is irrelevant for non-
banks. Likewise, it is desirable to have banks producing for other banks whenever possible,
and since banks can be monitored and punished with autarky, there is no need to use money
















their participation constraint is −e + βvb
j ≥ 0, due to the following: after producing and
incurring disutility e, the expected value for a bank is βvb
j, while the payoﬀ from deviating
is 0, because all individuals meeting with this bank can be instructed to never produce for
him once a deviation is recorded.
Let us suppose now that banks are allowed to issue notes. The duplication result of CW
states that one can reproduce any allocation that is achieved with the use of outside money
by using note creation and destruction instead. It is important to remark that this result
applies to any outside-money allocation, even to the one in which banks are instructed to
accept payments (a possibility not allowed in the value functions above for simplicity). In
order to state a limited version of the duplication result (which CW call the strict-subset
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in which gold coins are used by everybody, and construct an allocation without gold but with
the creation and destruction of bank notes. If any bank is given gold in the outside-money
allocation, then a state j = 1 is now assigned to him, and when that gold is spent by the
bank in the outside-money allocation, this bank is now allowed to print his own money and
exchange it with a producer. After that, his state is adjusted to j = 0. A bank in j =0
is prohibited from printing money and only moves to j = 1 in meetings where he receives a
note from a nonbank. It can easily be veriﬁed that the distribution of notes is the same now
as the distribution of gold in the outside-money allocation.
It also follows that this duplication is accomplished without reference to the welfare
criterion Z. Simply put, any outside-money allocation can be duplicated because the par-
ticipation constraint −e + βvb
j ≥ 0 stays the same across both regimes as long as the law of
motion of the state j is the same as that of money holdings with outside money.
The duplication result may seem obvious since, after all, it is just a statement that
monitoring and record keeping can substitute for outside-money use when banks are perfectly
monitored. However, it demonstrates that the diﬀerences between outside and inside money
do not pertain to the physical characteristics that money might exhibit, or even to the
aggregate quantity of money, but, rather, to the possibilities of creation and destruction
that a simple measure of monetary aggregates may not detect. In order to illustrate this
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banks are told to request payments from nonbank (money holding) consumers. They are
also allowed to print notes and use them to buy goods from nonbank producers. The value
functions for nonbanks now change to
¯ v
n







0)[u + β(¯ v
n
















1)[−e + β(¯ v
n
1 − ¯ v
n
0)].
The values ¯ vn
i now represent expected discounted utilities under this inside-money regulation.
Notice that we did not assign a state to bankers in these equations because we shall treat all
banks the same way, independently of their histories. As before, banks continue to give gifts
when they meet nonbank consumers without money. When they meet nonbank producers
without money, they issue a note to them in exchange for production. The value for a bank
is ¯ vb,w h e r e
¯ v









Participation constraints for banks and nonbanks do not change. We then have the following.
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by at least B 1−B
2 (u − e).
The welfare diﬀerential stated in Proposition 3 is only applicable when β is suﬃciently
high, so that participation constraints do not bind. The highest welfare attained by outside
money takes place when half of the nonbanks do not hold money, which is the same distribu-
tion achieved by the inside-money allocation discussed above. Hence, although the quantity
of money can be the same in both allocations, inside money allows a higher welfare by the
diﬀerence stated in the proposition because banks are now allowed to consume in meetings
with nonbanks without money, and the frequency of these meetings is given by B 1−B
2 .I f
outside money is not distributed optimally, then the welfare diﬀerential is even higher. If
B = 0, then all individuals are nonbanks and the inside-money allocation collapses to one
that can be duplicated with outside money chosen optimally. As pointed out by Wright
(1999), the CW approach allows the distribution of money to be chosen as part of optimal
allocations and, as a result, it establishes the robustness of inside money.
2.2.2 Reﬁnements of the CW model
There are reﬁnements of the CW model that add to the understanding of the properties of
inside money. We shall give a brief description of these developments before we discuss the
approach of CET, which contains related ﬁndings, and which is the basis of our experiments
relating liquidity to the proﬁtability of the banking sector.
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viduals face idiosyncratic productivity shocks that are private information. Although they
allow for divisible production, they characterize the optimum for parameters in which the
nonbank participation constraint does not bind. They show that, when the size of the bank-
ing sector is small and the probability of an adverse shock is also small, the optimum is
implemented by assigning banks a state variable assuming two values. Bank consumers in
the high state are allowed to consume from nonbanks. Bank producers in the high state
who announce that they received an adverse productivity shock are transferred to the low
state. Bank consumers in the low state receive a low consumption from nonbanks, and are
only transferred back to the high state after demonstrating, by showing their production,
that they received the high productivity shock. The authors thus provide an example of
inside money in which banks are assigned states that are not governed by their histories of
creation and destruction of notes, but, rather, by a system that monitors their production
announcements directly.
Mills (2001) extends the CW model in a diﬀerent direction. He assumes that banks
may, with some probability, engage in anonymous trades. He shows that optimal allocations
may require the use of both inside and outside money. In Mills’s model, outside money
can become necessary because outside money holdings can be used as evidence that banks
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inside money is uniform and not distinguished by the identity of the issuer. Otherwise, notes
issued by other banks, excluding a bank’s own notes, can be used as evidence of production
as in the models of WZ and CET. Mills’s model is nevertheless a nice illustration of how
certain limitations on the set of available mechanisms can produce a coexistence of inside
and outside money.
The review of the CW model presented by Wright (1999) may give the impression that
the only welfare gains allowed by inside money are due to an increase in bank consumption.
More recently, Cavalcanti (2004) considers a matching model in which the meetings between
banks and nonbanks are all unproductive, except that ﬁat and productive assets can change
hands. He shows that banks, being perfectly monitored as in CW, can be regulated so as
to use credit arrangements among themselves, which dispenses with the use of money, but
which leads to an eﬃcient reallocation of a productive asset termed capital. The author ﬁrst
compares this credit arrangement with one in which outside money is used by nonbanks who
are prohibited from trading with banks. He s h o w st h a tb a n k sa r ea b l et og e n e r a t eam o r e
eﬃcient allocation of capital than nonbanks can via the use of (outside) money. The author
then allows nonbanks to open “deposit” accounts in meetings with banks through a system
that lets banks to compare identities with passwords. With this system, nonbanks remain
anonymous in meetings with other nonbanks, but their histories of deposits and withdrawals
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include a degree of capital scarcity, it is shown that, at the optimum, inside money is issued
to nonbanks in exchange for capital, which is in the future intermediated to other nonbanks.
Cavalcanti’s model points out some new implications of the property that inside money
can be created with less restrictions imposedb yp a s th i s t o r i e s ,i nc o m p a r i s o nt oo u t s i d e
money. This additional liquidity can facilitate the allocation of other resources, such as
capital, and support welfare gains that go beyond changes related to bank consumption.
One possible avenue for future research is to study how interest payments in the form of
inside money, or, possibly, in the form of common goods like in the WZ model, may be used
to improve the allocation of intermediation services.
Cavalcanti and Forno (2003a) perform another study of the role of regulation in the CW
model. They start with the optimal inside-money allocation for a high β such that nonbank
participation constraints are weakly binding, and then reduce β continuously in order to
investigate how the optimum changes. When β is high, then nonzero production levels,
those maximizing the welfare criteria Z, equalize marginal utilities, u0(yii0
jj0), to one, so that
uii0
jj0 is equal to a constant u that is independent of the state. Thus, for high β,t h er o l e
of inside money identiﬁed by Wright (1999) emerges. Cavalcanti and Forno show, however,
that as β is reduced and the nonbank participation constraint starts to bind before that of
banks, then the optimum features no changes in the distribution of money, but it involves
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other words, banks start paying interest on notes. The intuition behind this result is that
by oﬀering a higher return on note redemption, banks increase the ex-ante return on money,
alleviating the nonbank participation constraints. Their result supports an alternative to
the Friedman rule because other factors, in addition to the quantity of money, determine the
return of inside money in the CW model. Using numerical methods, Cavalcanti and Forno
(2003a) extend their model by adding aggregate preference shocks to the CW environment.
They ﬁnd that interest rates diﬀer from contractions to expansions, due to diﬀerences in the
severity of participation constraints, and that welfare also improves when interest rates are
allowed to be non-stationary along a path of repeated realizations of aggregate shocks. In
particular, optimal interest rates may be autocorrelated even when shocks are iid.
Finally, another extension of the CW model provides a closer connection between bank
proﬁts and the provision of liquidity. Cavalcanti and Forno (2003b) study bank competition
by allowing banks to choose one out of two possible networks. Banks in a network issue notes
of the same color, but that color is distinct from that of the other network. They demonstrate
the existence of equilibria in which networks produce two opposing externalities. The credit
externality refers to the property that, as the mass of banks in one network increases, their
members can trade among themselves using future promises. These promises become more
valuable as the network size increases due to the higher frequency of meetings inside the
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size, more notes of that network ﬁnd their way into circulation, increasing the monetary
liability of each member of that network. The authors ﬁnd that when B,t h em e a s u r eo f
the bank sector, is small, there exists an equilibrium in network choice that is stable in a
particular ex-ante perspective. That stability is lost as B increases and credit dominates
the money-externality negative eﬀects. In that case, the equilibrium features a monopoly in
note issue, resembling the planner solution of CW.
The notion that monetary liabilities can have direct eﬀects on bank behavior, and rein-
forced eﬀects on the overall provision of liquidity in the economy, is an important motivation
for the model in CET, which we discuss next.
2.2.3 The Cavalcanti, Erosa, and Temzelides (1999) model
The ﬁrst paper to introduce inside money in medium-of-exchange models was, to our knowl-
edge, Cavalcanti, Erosa, and Temzelides (1999), CET for short. Their model has two dis-
tinguished features. First, they modelled the creation of circulating bank liabilities without
costs to money creation. In other words, the subject of CET was ﬁat money created pri-
vately. In this regard, the paper attempted to address the question posed by Fisher (1986)
of what he called the dynamic inconsistency of private money. In a monetary equilibrium,
one in which money has value, how could private agents create costless money without pro-
moting monetary instability? Fisher argued that promises of conservative creation would be
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fended the government provision of money, rather than those of Hayek, who favored currency
competition. The arguments in Fisher (1986) are provocative, but also seem too informal.
Without a formal model in which private money can be created systematically, it is hard to
provide insights about historical episodes in which ﬁnancial stability was achieved, or current
and future instances in which means of payments become increasingly private. The lack of
models of private money was eloquently documented in a survey by King (1983).
CET oﬀer an alternative to the dynamic inconsistency pointed out by Fisher (1986).
They argue that some degree of monitoring can support a stable banking system. The
monitoring in CET was related to record-keeping of reserves. The punishment for negative
reserves was assumed to be bank dissolution, with the failing bank becoming anonymous but
not isolated from nonbank life.9 Under decentralized random meetings, and without access
to centralized markets, banks could not use arbitrage opportunities to generate unbounded
proﬁts instantaneously. A strategy of always issuing money, without building reserves, could
9This speciﬁcation is in some agreement to the free banking era in the United States (1837-1865). During
that period, banks were penalized for failing to convert their notes into specie upon demand. In fact, at
least in some states, if the bank failed to redeem (notes plus some penalty fee) within a grace period, the
bank was forced to close down. Interestingly, while banks were by law obliged to redeem their notes for
specie, notes issued by other banks were typically accepted as a substitute. Under typical (but certainly not
all) circumstances, there was little or no discount between private notes issued by banks in good standing
and specie. On the other hand, notes issued by banks that were likely to fail traded at great discount. See
Gorton (1996) for a detailed discussion.
38
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 394
September 2004only add utility at discrete increments over time. Thus, the punishment of bank dissolution,
with a small but positive probability, could render this strategy too risky, since a dissolved
bank would lose all the prospective proﬁt opportunities of a conservative bank. Additional
explanations of why steady states with creation of inside money by banks may not only exist
b u ti m p r o v ew e l f a r ew e r el a t e rd e v e l o p e di nv ersions of the CW model. As seen above, these
versions choose the bank’s payoﬀ and punishment optimally, among the available alternatives
that respect individual rationality.
A second feature of CET was the modeling of reserve management by banks in an envi-
ronment with ﬂoat, fractional reserves and possible bank failure. They used the simplifying
assumption that a bank consumer could not distinguish whether a producer was a bank
or a nonbank. In the next section, we modify this assumption, by allowing banks with
unfavorable reserves to avoid note issue in meetings with other banks. We use numerical
methods and phase diagrams to illustrate bank behavior in the (r,m)-space. In the com-
puted examples, some banks with r<mdo not issue to other banks, but issue to nonbanks
in order to maximize the payoﬀ from ﬂoat. Thus, ﬂoat payoﬀs need not result from interest
payments on reserves, but can also result from the attempt to reach a balance between a
fractional-reserve policy, with good short-run consumption opportunities, and a tolerable
risk of bank failure.10 Banks in CET are allowed to issue as many notes as they want and
10On the one hand, this ﬁnding is in some sense contrary to Friedman’s pessimistic view on free banking, as
expressed in his “Program for Monetary Stability.” He argues that in situations where individuals engage in
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notes is also governed by bank policies, since banks are endogenously choosing how many
notes to issue and how many notes to destroy (by building reserves). Thus, general equi-
librium eﬀects link bank behavior to ﬂoat averages and back to bank behavior. CET did
not explore these possibilities further, nor did they investigate how the parameters of the
model, including policies injecting money into private-banks’ reserves, would interact with
such general equilibrium eﬀects. We explore some of these interactions in section 4.
3 Our model
Our model contains elements of both CET and WZ. With exception of the demographics,
the goods-structure is that of our review of WZ. We include in each date both the random-
meeting goods (the number of types is k>2), and the general good, used to pay interest
on reserves at rate R, and to collect the taxes ﬁnancing these payments. The utility of
consuming general goods (earning interest) and the disutility of producing general goods
transactions with others that are far removed in “space and acquaintance, and [in which] a long period may
e l a p s eb e t w e e nt h ei s s u eo fap r o m i s ea n dt h ed e m a n df o ri t sf u l ﬁllment,” it is likely that proﬁt incentives will
result in unsound practices, which will result in the instability of monetary trades. On the other hand, it is
clear that there are very diverse experiences regarding the performance of monetary systems with an explicit
use of private money. The Scottish banking system, for example, is widely recognized as being successful,
while the American experience of the nineteen century is mixed. Even within the same period, and the same
country, the experience of Michigan, Illinois, and Wisconsin during the free banking era is considered to be
a failure, while the experience in New York is considered to be a success. See King (1983) and Rolnick and
Weber (1983, 1984) for detailed discussions.
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subtract from the equilibrium value functions, when R>0, a constant that equals total
interest paid to the bank sector. For simplicity of the presentation, we ignore this constant
(the tax rate) from our Bellman equations, although we make the necessary adjustments
when computing welfare measures.
As before, we limit nonbank holdings to i ∈ {0,1}. The state of a bank is (r,m). Unlike
the WZ model, the level of reserves of a bank, r, can be less than the number of notes in
circulation, m. There exists a central bank that shuts down banks that experience a number
of redemptions, in the end of a period, exceeding reserves. The old notes of a failed bank in
circulation remain valid and are accepted in trade, because the central bank “honors” these
liabilities by accepting them, as deposits of reserves from any other bank, at any future date.
A failed bank is, however, prohibited from issuing new notes. Hence all notes in circulation
are valid notes, and they never pose a risk to nonbanks. In order to produce the simplifying
result that banks always deposit notes with the central bank, even if R = 0, we assume
that a failed bank exits the banking industry with a valid note and continues to trade as
a nonbank. Hence, depositing notes is a dominant strategy for active banks, even in the
absence of interest payments on reserves. We do not need to distinguish failed banks from
the original nonbanks.
In order to accommodate the possibility of failure within the steady-state analysis, we
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nonbanks, and there is a constant outﬂow. That is accomplished by the simple assumption
that, with probability δ ∈ (0,1), an individual dies and is replaced by another individual
with the same type. The notes in circulation of a bank that dies remain valid for deposits
with the central bank. A note held by a nonbank that dies is cleared by the central bank,
so that δ introduces a lower bound on the probability of redemption π.A ss a i da b o v e ,t h e
probability π is no longer a parameter. We do not allow swaps of notes in meetings and,
since the measure of active banks is endogenous, the reserve-management behavior of banks
determines π.T h e e ﬀective discount factor, after death rates are taken into account, is
β =( 1− δ)˜ β ∈ (0,1), where ˜ β is the original discount rate. Unlike WZ, we assume that
banks meet with other banks and, unlike CET, we assume that banks know when their trade
partner is a bank (who deposits notes immediately).
We denote the nonbank expected discounted utility, before taxes, by vn
i ,a n dt h a tf o ra
bank by vb
r,m (wj
r,m just before redemptions are computed). Their present value is zero when
dead. The sequence of events for within a period is displayed below.
t → possibility of death → vn
i , vb
r,m → meetings → trade and
deposits → w
j
r0,m0 → reserves updated and interest paid t +1
Sequence of Events
We let pn
i denote the measure of nonbanks holding i ∈ {0,1} unit of money and pb
r,m
denote the measure of banks in state (r,m) before trade meetings. Due to discounting,
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decision for nonbanks refers to the acceptance of money in exchange for production. Clearly,
a nonbank producer in state i = 0 engages in trade whenever β(vn
1 − vn
0) >e .W e s h a l l
restrict parameters so that this is indeed the case in monetary steady states.
When banks in state (r,m) are in a meeting where they can produce, they improve
their reserves position by accepting money in exchange for production, with probability
γr,m ∈ [0,1]. Notice that while nonbanks always agree to exchange money for consumption,
that decision is nontrivial for banks. We shall see that a concern about building reserves can
induce banks to behave diﬀerently. When deciding whether to issue a note, in exchange for
consumption, their behavior may depend on their reserve positions and also on whether the




r,m denote the probabilities
that a bank in state (r,m)i s s u e san o t et oan o n b a n ka n dt oab a n k ,r e s p e c t i v e l y . W i t h
this notation, the value functions for nonbanks are given by equations (1) and (2) of the WZ
model, with φr,m replaced by φ
n
r,m.
I fab a n ki s s u e san e wn o t et oar e c i p i e n tt h a ti sa l s oab a n k ,t h ef a c tt h a tt h en e wn o t e
is deposited and does not enter circulation is marked by adding to the bank state, before
redemptions are computed, the indicator j = 0. If the new note does enter circulation,
because it has been issued to a nonbank, the indicator instead is j =1 . A f t e rr e s e r v e
balances are ﬁnally updated, banks infer the quantity of notes that remain in circulation.
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one note, one ﬁnds that the current wj
r,m depends on next period values according to
w
j





















with the understanding that the sum is taken with respect to i, with values ranging from 0
to m−j possible redemptions. Considering now that the number of banks willing to create
money in meetings with other banks is given by the inner product φ
b ·pb, it follows that the
fraction of the population willing to purchase from a bank is φ
b · pb + pn
1.T h u s , a b a n k ’ s







































where, as before, u and e are the utility from consumption and the disutility from production,
respectively, with u>e .
We now turn to the description of the supply of money. There are two sources of money
injection. The ﬁrst source is exogenous. We assume that every period, a fraction µn of the
newborns are nonbanks receiving 1 monetary unit. Hence, µnδ equals the inﬂow measure
of outside assets. The second source is endogenous. We also assume that a fraction µb
of the newborns, where µb < 1 − µn, are each endowed with a banking technology. The
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failure in equilibrium, then the parameter µb would be the counterpart of the parameter B
of the models reviewed above. Besides the newborns starting with outside money or with
the banking technology, there exists a fraction of nonbank newborns, 1 − µn − µb, starting
with zero monetary units. We shall restrict attention to outcomes in which private money
is treated as a perfect substitute to outside money in all trades, and we use our notation
accordingly. In particular, there is no need to decompose the state of a nonbank, i,i n t o
holdings of either outside or inside money.
The ﬁnal aspect of bank regulation is the assignment of initial states to newborn banks.
Let us suppose that all newborn banks are assigned (r,m)=( ¯ r,0) as an initial state, and
let us consider momentarily an arbitrary cut-oﬀ reserve level r∗, for determining failure. If
R = 0, it is clear that the same banking behavior should follow from assigning (¯ r − r∗,0)
as an initial state and changing the cut-oﬀ level to zero. Hence, with respect to policies
that keep R = 0, we can, without loss of generality, ﬁxt h el o w e rb o u n df o rr e s e r v e sa s
r∗ =0a n dc o n s i d e rd i ﬀerent choices of initial balances ¯ r. W ed os oa s s u m i n gt h a tt h e
state of a newborn bank is (¯ r,0). The distributions (pn,p b)m u s tr e m a i ni n v a r i a n t ,g i v e nt h e
interest-rate policy, the money-injection parameters, the bank strategies, and the fact that
nonbanks accept money in trade. The restrictions imposed by stationarity are described in
the Appendix, by means of an operator mapping a current distribution into one for the next
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interest, which the ﬁxed point allows to be computed, are the probability of redemption, π,
and the measure of bank failure per period, z.
In summary, the money supply is endogenous and depends on banking regulation and
monetary policy. Monetary policy is characterized in the model by µn, describing the distri-
bution of outside money given to nonbank newborns, by (µb, ¯ r), describing the entry rate and
reserve position of new banks, and by R, describing the interest rate on reserves. The next
subsection brieﬂy discusses the existence of a stationary symmetric equilibrium exhibiting
certain properties.
3.1 Existence of steady states
In a steady state, banks and nonbanks make their consumption and savings decisions taking
as given the policy parameters and the variables pn, pb and π, as well as the decision of
others. We now discuss how these variables are determined in equilibrium. We let Tγ,φn,φb
denote the continuous mapping, implied by any given list of strategies (γ,φ
n,φ
b), which
maps (pn,p b) into the next period’s distribution of individuals across states (deﬁned in the
Appendix). We deﬁne steady states as follows.
Deﬁnition 4 A monetary steady-state equilibrium is an array
(vn,v b,w,γ,φ
n,φ
b,p n,p b,π) satisfying the Bellman equations (1)-(2), with φ = φ
n,a sw e l l
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1 − vn
0) >e ; (γ,φ
n,φ
b) attains the maximum in (5); (pn,p b) is
a ﬁxed point of Tγ,φn,φb;a n dπ = δ +( 1− δ)γ · pb.
Regarding the last equilibrium condition, we notice the following. Inside money held by
nonbanks is redeemed upon death. Its is also redeemed when nonbanks survive but trade in
meetings with bank producers, an event occurring with probability (1−δ)γ ·pb.A sar e s u l t ,
π = δ +( 1− δ)γ · pb.
In every period, there is a constant inﬂow of newborn nonbanks without money, of mea-
sure δ(1 − µn − µb) > 0. This fact can be used to derive a condition (see Lemma 1 below)
relating β, u/e, k and 1 − µb − µn,s ot h a tβ(vn
1 − vn
0) >eholds for any ﬁxed point (pn,p b).
This condition suﬃces to produce a degree of scarcity of money, relative to β and to u/e,
so that money has value independently of bank behavior, provided that a stationary distri-
bution of banks exists. We go beyond this simple argument and show that, as β is chosen
suﬃciently high, bank behavior becomes more conservative and oriented to building reserves,
up to the point that bank failure is essentially eliminated. Without loss of generality, we
proceed by ﬁxing R = 0 (positive values of R tend to give money intrinsic value, facilitating
the existence of steady states). In this case, however, given a ﬁxed β,b a n k sw i t hs u ﬃciently
high reserves choose to issue notes when m = r, thus becoming illiquid. That is so because,
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proceeds by following similar steps at those in CET. We restrict attention to the case in
which R = 0, and every newborn bank starts with ¯ r = 0 reserves (although the numer-
ical experiments use diﬀerent speciﬁcations). We ﬁrst restrict nonbanks to accept money
(as stated in the Bellman equations for nonbanks). Next we restrict banks to back note
issue by 100% reserves on a range of the state space indexed by a constant S (banks in





r,r =0f o rr ≤ S. Non-restricted banks choose their strategies optimally.
We then construct a correspondence, ψ, producing new steady-state candidates from any
given array (vn,v b,w,γ,φ
n,φ
b,p n,p b,π), customarily, as follows. We determine new lists for
(γ,φ
n,φ
b) according to the above restrictions for r ≤ S, and as the correspondence of strate-
gies that attains the maximum in the right-hand side of Bellman equations, given the old
list (vn,vb,w,γ,φ
n,φ
b,p n,p b,π), for the unrestricted states. The restrictions and maximiza-
tions also give a new triple (vn,v b,w) as the left-hand side. Next, the new measures over
states are given by Tγ,φn,φb a p p l i e do n( pn,p b), and π is computed according to the formula
π = δ+(1−δ)γ·pb. The existence of a restricted steady-state equilibrium then follows since
ψ satisﬁes the conditions of Kakutani’s ﬁxed-point theorem.11
11We assume an upper bound (N,N) on the state space for banks, so that this space becomes compact.
Because δ > 0, the measure of banks who survive until they reach a state outside this upper bound can
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individual nonbank, the fact that other nonbanks without money, as well as newborn banks,
are willing to accept money with probability one implies a lower bound on (pn
0 +pb·γ). Thus,
if β is suﬃciently high, the restriction β(vn
1 − vn
0) >eis nonbinding (see also Lemma 1).
For β suﬃciently large, the restrictions for banks are also nonbinding. Notice that if
φ
b
r,r =0a n dφ
n
r,r = 0 are nonbinding for r ≤ S,t h e nγr,r = 1 is also nonbinding for r ≤ S;
otherwise, banks would be choosing a form of autarky after reaching a level of reserves r ≤ S.




r,r = 0 is indeed nonbinding for r ≤ S.I t s u ﬃces to show that
vb
0,0 − vn
1 can be made arbitrarily large, by picking β suﬃciently close to one in a restricted
steady state. If φ
b
r,r = 1, a bank faces, with probability 1, the possibility of losing vb
0,0 − vn
1.
The relevant case, thus, concerns the case where a bank consumer meets a nonbank producer.
If φr,r = 1, a bank faces, with positive probability, the possibility of losing vb
0,0 −vn
1 after
one period in the event of excess redemptions. From the Bellman equation for banks, we know
that φ
n
r,r = 0 is implied if u + w1
r,r+1 <w 0
r,r holds or, equivalently, if u<w 0
r,r − w0
r,r+1.N o w ,
w0
r,r −w0
r,r+1 is bounded below by βπr(1−qb)(vb
0,0−vn
1), where πr equals the probability that
all notes are redeemed and (1−qb) represents the probability that the bank cannot increase






r,r =0i fu<βπ r(1−qb)(vb
0,0−vn
1)
for all r ≤ S.S i n c eπr ≥ δ
r > 0a n d1− qb >
(k−1)
k (1 − µn)δ > 0, the conclusion follows if
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0,0 − vn
1 →∞as β → 1. This completes the existence argument.
3.2 Derivation of key strategies
In this section, we describe optimal strategies of any given monetary steady-state equilibrium
with R =0 . W eﬁrst establish some properties of the value functions and of the banks’
strategies. These properties are of independent interest but they are also used in guiding the
computational experiments that we perform in the next section. We start with a sequence of
preliminary Lemmas. The proofs appear in the Appendix. The ﬁrst Lemma gives a suﬃcient
condition for nonbanks to accept money (outside or private) in exchange for production. The










e −1, then β(vn
1 − vn
0) ≥ e.
Note that the condition of Lemma 1 will tend to be satisﬁed if the discount factor is large
and if the fraction of newborns that are banks is small. If the fraction of banks is too high,
a steady-state equilibrium where money is valued might not exist. It is also intuitive that
nonbanks accept money when the ratio u/e is suﬃciently high.
The next Lemma asserts that the value function of a bank is increasing in the amount of
reserves and decreasing in the amount of liabilities in circulation.
vb
0,0 −vn
1 is suﬃciently large. The same argument as in CET (p. 941) can now be applied to
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r,m is weakly increasing in r a n dw e a k l yd e c r e a s i n gi nm.
Our next lemma says that the value of a bank is always greater than the value of a
nonbank holding one unit of money which, in turn, is greater than the value of a nonbank
with no money holdings. Banks can do everything that nonbanks can and, in addition, they
can build reserves and “borrow” by costlessly issuing new money. This additional value
of being a bank, which partly relies on assumptions that guarantee limited entry into the
banking sector, plays an important role in the numerical results, in which we study the
eﬀects of central-bank policies on note issue. In particular, policies injecting outside money
(including changes on initial reserves) will aﬀect bank returns, and, thus, the behavior of
banks regarding issue.




Our remaining goal in this subsection is to describe key policy rules for banks throughout
the state space. We divide our analysis into three propositions regarding meetings with other
banks and with nonbanks. First, we describe the behavior of liquid banks. Such banks have
reserves that exceed their total amount of money in circulation. Since future payoﬀsa r e
discounted, and R = 0, a liquid bank will always ﬁnd it optimal to issue an additional
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suﬃciently exceed the amount of its money in circulation, a bank will ﬁnd it optimal to stop
building additional reserves. This is because the beneﬁt from extra reserves will come in the
distant future and is, thus, discounted, while the cost of production is incurred today.
Proposition 4. For all r and m, with r>m , φ
n
r,m =1 .Moreover, for every m, there exists
an rm such that, if r ≥ rm,t h e nγr,m =0 .
N e x t ,w ed e s c r i b et h eb e h a v i o ro filliquid banks. These are banks whose total amount
of money in circulation exceeds their reserves. When r is relatively low, such banks are
facing a positive probability of closure. Note that, as r grows, a bank issuing money at state
(r,r) faces a diminishing probability of being caught with negative reserves. In the limit,
this probability becomes arbitrarily small. In this case, the short-term gains dominate and
the bank issues money, even to other banks, in order to consume. Of course, some illiquid
banks are caught with negative reserves and have to exit the sector. To avoid exit, such
banks typically ﬁnd it optimal to suﬀer the disutility of production in order to improve their
reserves.
12That behavior does not necessarily follow in meetings with other banks. In the next section, we show
simulations in which there is a “multiplier eﬀect.” If notes issued to nonbanks have a high ﬂoat, then some
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n
r,r =1 .
The next proposition describes the behavior of banks that are “too illiquid” in the sense
that m−r is positive and large. Banks that have very low reserves compared to the amount
of their money in circulation will concentrate on issuing more notes instead of building
additional reserves, since they expect to exit the banking sector with high probability in the
near future. We call such banks wildcats.13




The statements in the above propositions are summarized in Figure 1 (see Appendix).
As the values of r and m vary, the optimal strategies give rise to the possibility of four
regions in the (r,m)-space. In region I reserves are high compared to money in circulation.
In that case, a bank ﬁnds it optimal to issue money. At the same time, such a bank rejects
opportunities to increase reserves. Banks in region II still ﬁnd it optimal to issue money,
but being less liquid, they also accept trades that increase reserves. Banks in region III
are becoming alarmingly illiquid and ﬁnd it optimal to both improve their reserves and
13The term “wildcat bank” originates in the 1800s, when it was applied to banks that were established in
inaccessible locations in order to avoid redemptions of their notes. The term has become synonymous with
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these banks concentrate on improving their reserve position.14 Finally, banks in region IV
have too few reserves compared to their notes in circulation and will thus have to exit the
banking sector with high probability in the near future. These banks would not beneﬁtf r o m
a single-unit increase in their reserves, and thus issue money until they are caught with a
negative balance. Notice that the redemption process reduces both reserves and the notes
in circulation by the same number and thus always moves a bank southwest, in parallel to
the 45-degree line. We remark that banks might enter region IV either accidently, when the
redemption process brings them there from another region, or intentionally, after issuing too
many notes. In both cases, they never leave this region before exiting the banking sector.15
4N u m e r i c a l ﬁndings
In this section, we present the outcomes of numerical simulations of the model, for several
diﬀerent parameterizations, including some policy experiments. We emphasize that these
simulations are not meant to generate quantitative predictions. Rather, they serve as an
additional device for exploring the qualitative eﬀects of varying the economic environment on
optimal bank behavior. Some of the changes might be interpreted as the result of government
14Region III might be a subset of the 45-degree line.








r,m =1 . In general, even when R =0 ,
the possibility that φ
b
r,m =0f o rr>mcannot be ruled out.
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of a typical inside-money economy. Then, we study the eﬀects of paying interest on reserves
and those of varying the stock of outside money. Finally, we study the eﬀects of diﬀerent
regulations, changing the endowment of initial reserves and prohibiting money creation,
followed by parameter changes that increase entry into the banking sector.
Before presenting the simulation results, we shall brieﬂy comment on the assumptions
of our model that allowed the numerical task to be reasonably simple. We have assumed
that goods are indivisible and money holdings are restricted to {0,1}, so that there is no
need to compute the intensive margin;t h a ti s ,h o wm u c ho u t p u ti st r a d e di ne a c hm o n e t a r y
transaction. As indicated in our propositions about the WZ model, if we had ruled out
bank failure, and restricted ourselves to outside-money economies, then the linearity of vb
with respect to the interest-rate R would still hold with divisible goods. In that case, it is
conceivable to use numerical methods to compute steady states with divisible production and
general currency holdings. When we allow for bank failure, however, that linearity is lost,
and the state space for banks must include both reserves and notes in circulation. Moreover,
predicting then higher moments of the redemption process becomes more complicated, if
nonbanks can hold multiple units, and banks have to remember how many notes they issued
to each nonbank in the past, now classiﬁed by wealth levels. Therefore, assuming the set
{0,1} for nonbank holdings greatly simpliﬁes each relevant history to a simple pair, (r,m).
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We conclude, therefore, that it might be diﬃcult to extend our experiments with bank
failure to general holdings, unless tractable approximations of the much larger state space
are developed.
The numerical examples below are based on the following parameter values: we set the
number of types, k, to 3; the exogenous probability of death, δ,i sﬁxed at .2; the fraction of
newborn agents holding government currency, µn, and those born as banks, µb,a r es e ta t.2
and .1, respectively; utility associated to consumption, u,i sﬁxed at .5 and the disutility from
production, e,i ss e ta t.2. The above choices for parameter values imply that the suﬃcient
condition in Lemma 1 is satisﬁed as long as β >. 741. We set the eﬀective discount factor
as β = .995. We also force banks to have a maximum of ten units of reserves and ten units
of money in circulation (N =1 0 ) .
We assume initially that banks are born with two units of reserves (¯ r =2 ) ,a n dt h a tn o
interest is paid on reserves (R = 0). Unless stated otherwise, the parameter values remain
constant in the examples below.
4.1 The benchmark: An inside-money economy
T h ep a r a m e t e r sa n dp o l i c ys e t t i n g so ft h i ss u b s e c t i o nd e ﬁne our benchmark. Under this
parametrization we ﬁnd illiquid banks in our simulations. That is, we ﬁnd banks crossing
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regarding issue: there are four states on the diagonal ((0,0), (1,1),(2,2),(3,3)) for which
banks do not issue to nonbanks. Moreover, there are states in which a bank, concerned about
redemptions, would issue to a nonbank but not to a bank (states (4,4) and (5,5)). Note also
that there are states where banks exhibit wildcat behavior. In particular, Figures 2 and 3
indicate that there are states in the northwest corner in which illiquid banks do not produce
while they choose to issue money. Thus, banks in that region exit the banking sector in the
near future. To document wildcat behavior by some banks in equilibrium, it remains to be
shown that a positive fraction of banks will enter that region. Figure 3 demonstrates that
this is indeed the case. Interestingly, banks do not enter into the wildcat region unwillingly.
Rather, banks enter that region because of their decision to print an extra note, and not
because of the redemption process. In fact, the redemption process alone will not bring
a bank into that region since it moves a bank southwest on a negative 45-degree line (see
Figures 2 and 3 ). Notice that it is possible for a bank to enter the wildcat region even if
no note is redeemed during his lifetime up to that point. This is exhibited, for example, by
the behavior of a bank that has four units of reserves and keeps issuing notes to nonbanks
with no notes being redeemed. Eventually the bank gets to the state (r,m)=( 4 ,8), where
he will enter into the ergodic wildcat region.
57
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 394
September 20044.2 Paying interest on reserves
Illiquidity has non-trivial implications for aggregate welfare in the economy of subsection 4.1.
Illiquid banks that produce, or even wildcats that do not, play a positive role in providing
scarce liquidity. However, there is also a social cost associated to wildcats since these banks
stop building reserves (producing) and eventually fail. One possible lesson from the previous
subsection is that additional policies might be required for limiting ﬁnancial fragility, in the
simple context of our model. In order to assess the role of bank returns in the matter of
stability, we now consider positive interest payments on reserves; that is, R>0. The interest
payments are ﬁnanced with a lump sum tax on banks and nonbanks, deduced from utility in
our welfare measures. We consider three values for the interest rate on reserves, R =0 , .002,
and .02 (the economy with R = 0 corresponds to that of subsection 4.1).
Table 1 illustrates how a policy of “high” interest rates on reserves (R = .02) can be
disastrous for nonbank welfare. We ﬁnd that, as R increases from 0 to .02, average nonbank
welfare decreases from 4.54 to 2.911, but average welfare of banks, not surprisingly, increases
from 6.9t o2 8 .09. Because of the interest paid, banks become too concerned about losing
reserves and choose not to issue to nonbanks while they are liquid (see Figures 3 and 4 below).
Banks thus provide very little liquidity in the economy (they actually destroy liquidity), so
the mass of consumers holding notes decreases signiﬁcantly, relative to subsection 4.1, which
explains the decline in nonbank welfare.
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of increasing interest rates, from 0 to .002, raises average nonbank welfare, and decreases
average bank welfare (recall that the welfare eﬀects of increasing R from 0 to .02 had the
opposite signs). As R is raised to .002, the fraction of the population per type that is willing
to spend a note, q,i n c r e a s e sf r o m.1083 to .1159 (see Table 1). Nonbank consumers thus
have a higher ability to spend in the economy with R = .002, which allows them to increase
average consumption and welfare (despite the lump sum taxes paid to ﬁnance the policy).
The reason why nonbanks can buy consumption goods more frequently when R = .002 is
that private note issue to nonbanks is relatively high in this economy (pb · φ
n is .0318 when
R = .002, instead of .0279 in subsection 4.1).
These ﬁndings raise the following question: why are banks more willing to issue notes to
nonbanks in the economy with R = .002 than in the economy with R = 0? In principle, when
the central bank pays interest on reserves, onew o u l de x p e c tb a n k st ob em o r ec o n s e r v a t i v e
regarding note issue and to work harder for accumulating reserves. General-equilibrium
forces, however, can reverse the sign of these eﬀects. When a low interest rate is used
(R = .002), banks compete harder for reserves, as illustrated by the observation that there
are three states, below the 45-degree line, in which banks do not issue notes to other banks
(states (1,0),(2,0) and (2,1) in Figure 7). This competition for reserves decreases the
consumption frequency of banks, without improving aggregate reserves of the banking sector
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bank that issues the note to the bank that receives the note). In particular, one ﬁnds that
banks are less willing to consume from other banks when R = .002, since pb·φ
b is now .0064
instead of .0279. This eﬀect translates into a reduction in the welfare of the average bank.
A reduction of the average value of banks, in turn, makes them more willing to issue notes
as the penalty for exiting the industry becomes smaller. These nonlinear eﬀects, in general
equilibrium, lead to an increase of liquidity and to an increase of the average nonbank welfare,
which, again, reduces the penalty for exiting the industry and reinforces the incentives to
issue more notes. As a result, as R is raised from 0 to .002, the fraction of illiquid banks
increases from .003% to 3.6%, with banks producing less (when R is set to .002 banks stop
producing in states (0,3),(1,4) and (2,5)).
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R (interest on reserves). 0 . 0 0 2 . 0 2
vn
0 4.423 4.619 2.824
vn
1 4.835 5.020 3.267
Avg. nonbank welfare 4.54 4.731 2.911
Avg. bank welfare 6.90 6.814 28.09
pn
0 .2196 .2167 .2412
pn
1 .0804 .0840 .0588
p = pn
0 + pb · γb .2529 .2492 .2745
q = pn
1 + pb · φ
n .1083 .1159 .0588
p × q .0274 .0289 .0161
qb = pn
1 + pb · φ
b .1083 .0905 .0588
pb · φ
n .0279 .0318 .0000
pb · φ
b .0279 .0064 .0000
pb · γb .0333 .0326 .0333
The following table compares the two environments discussed previously. An interest
rate of .02 gives rise to no computed illiquidity, while an interest rate of .002 produces a
simulation with a larger mass of illiquid banks than in the economy with R =0 .
T a b l e2 :B a n kb e h a v i o ra n dt h ei n t e r e s tr a t e
R =0 R = .002 R = .02
No. states with no consumption 10 7 136
when meeting a bank 66 6 8
when meeting a nonbank 41 6 8
No. states with no production 25 28 15
Fraction of illiquid banks .003% 3.6% 0%
Fraction of wildcats .00004% .17% 0%
No. of banks exiting industry .0002% .44% 0%
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We now return to the case R = 0 and investigate the eﬀects of endowing banks with more
reserves. As mentioned earlier, injecting more initial reserves is equivalent to allowing a
weaker shut-down rule. It can also be loosely interpreted as a lending of last resort for banks
with diﬃculties. We emphasize that in our model, the central bank (or clearing authority)
needs to know only the reserve balances of banks and not the number of their notes in
circulation.
We compare equilibrium for ¯ r = 2, our benchmark, with ¯ r =4 . The corresponding
decision rules are represented graphically in Figures 8 and 9. We ﬁnd that banks behave
more conservatively when they can borrow (are endowed with) 4 units of reserves rather
than 2. In fact, banks, in the computed range of r,m ≤ 10, do not become illiquid when
¯ r = 4 (they only issue notes in states in which r>m ,b o t hi nm e e t i n g sw i t hb a n k sa n dw i t h
nonbanks). Thus, banks do not risk failure in this simulation. Moreover, banks are also
concerned about building reserves. Notice that the number of states in which they decide
to produce, in order to improve their reserve position increases.16 By injecting money into
the banking sector, the central bank increases trade and bank values. Consequently, their
16The total liabilities of the central bank are given by all the notes in circulation. Notice that in steady
state, some of the notes circulating were issued by banks that have died or have exited the industry. Since
the central bank accepts all notes as valid reserves, there is a sense in which the liabilities of the central bank
exceed the sum of the liabilities of banks.
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recommendations proposed in historical episodes of great liquidity shortages and banking
crises.
Some additional ﬁndings are summarized in the following table. The table reveals that
the liquidity injected by the central bank is absorbed by the banks, so that the mass of
nonbanks with money does not increase.
Table 3: Eﬀects of an injection of reserves





Avg. nonbank welfare 4.54 4.733





As Table 3 shows, both banks’ and nonbanks’ utility increases when banks receive more
initial reserves (are allowed to borrow some reserves). Notice that the increase in utility
is larger for banks than for nonbanks. Thus, the penalty for banks exiting the industry
(as deﬁned by the diﬀerence between the value function of a bank and a that of nonbank
c o n s u m e r )i sl a r g e ri nt h i sc a s e . 17 As a result, banks behave conservatively even in this
17We also ﬁnd simulations, not included, in which setting β to a high value produces a similar eﬀect: the
value of a bank increases relative to that of a nonbank, virtually eliminating bank illiquidity.
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bank failure in the economy of subsection 4.1, and that the injection of reserves produces an
(virtually) outside-money economy with an increase in welfare. The improvement supported
by outside money cannot be interpreted, however, as a counter-example to the ﬁndings of
CW and others. The comparison between inside and outside money is more meaningful when
restrictions on money holdings are symmetric across banks and nonbanks. Here, nonbanks
can hold at most one unit of money. When banks fail and become nonbanks, there is a
welfare loss resulting from the fact that the failed bank cannot store high levels of wealth
as before. That gives an advantage to outside money in our simulation. Subsection 4.3 just
shows that there exist inside-money economies with excessive failure. In order to add further
perspective into the gains provided by inside money, we consider now a liquidity shortage,
and how allowing bank illiquidity can improve welfare signiﬁcantly.
4.4 Inside money as a source of liquidity
In this experiment, we modify our benchmark so that outside money is more scarce. To this
end, we decrease the fraction of newborn individuals to δ = .1( i n s t e a do fδ = .2), and we
decrease the fraction of newborn nonbanks with money to µn = .1( i n s t e a do fµn = .2).18
As a result, the measure of newborn nonbanks with money is reduced by one fourth relative
18Al o w e rv a l u ef o rδ implies that banks have a higher chance of becoming illiquid since banks’ expected
lifetime is inversely related to δ.
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environments, keeping R =0 . W ev a r y¯ r in {1,4}, and consider two possible regulations:
one imposing a 100% reserve requirement (imposing outside money), and the other allowing
banks to become illiquid (to provide inside money), as before.
We look ﬁrst at the regulation allowing inside money. Since liquidity is potentially scarce
with δ = .1a n dµn = .1, banks have a hard time building reserves to support issue and,
as a result, they are quite willing to become illiquid. The decisions for banks regarding
issue are represented graphically in Figure 10, with ¯ r =1a n d¯ r = 4 represented on the
left and right panels, respectively. Figure 10 reveals that issue is indeed less conservative
now than in the benchmark. There are now fewer states in the diagonal for which banks do
not issue notes. Surprisingly, there are states in which banks, despite being liquid, forgo a
consumption opportunity when meeting another bank . In these states (below the 45-degree
line), banks avoid issuing money that will be cleared immediately. They prefer to use the
extra reserves to support multiple money issue in the future (a kind of multiplier eﬀect).
In order to study the role of inside money as a source of liquidity, we now evaluate
how welfare would be aﬀected if banks were not allowed to become illiquid. This outside-
money regulation could be implemented by an arbitrarily large (exogenous) penalty to banks
caught with negative reserves, or by a central-bank policy that prevents banks from printing
65
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 394
September 2004their own currency, allowing them to put in circulation only government currency (which is
earned as they accumulate reserves). A comparison of columns 1 and 2 in Table 4 reveals
that allowing banks to become illiquid, when ¯ r =1 ,c a np r o v i d eas i g n i ﬁcant boost to the
average welfare of both banks and nonbanks. Inside money responds to liquidity scarcity,
as indicated by the fact that 18.6% of banks in this economy are illiquid. Moreover, private
money, as a fraction of the aggregate money stock, increases from 48.7% to 64% as banks
are allowed to become illiquid. The increase in liquidity comes at a cost since 1.7% of banks
are shut down each period, due to their negative reserve position.19
When evaluating the role of banks in providing liquidity, it is helpful to distinguish
between inside money and private money, although that may not be a trivial task, as our
literature review suggests. In our model, inside money certainly takes the form of note issue
not backed by reserves, so that banks create liquidity when they issue unbacked liabilities.
Here, when banks issue notes that are backed by accumulated reserves, they are just changing
the physical aspects of the means of payments, without necessarily adding additional liquidity
to the economy. How much extra liquidity is generated by inside money is an open question,
and the choice of an appropriate measurement is not trivial.20
19The fraction of failed banks that become wildcats intentionally (issue one more unit), as opposed to
accidentally (due to an unlucky outcome of the redemption process), is .9993 for ¯ r =1 ,a n d.995 for ¯ r =4 .








Since money is destroyed at a rate π, the stock of circulating notes issued by banks is given by ∆/π.T h e







r,m, and the stock of inside
money measured as Ω/π. In subsection 4.4, when banks are allowed to become illiquid in the economy with
¯ r = 1, the measure of inside money, relative to total holdings, increases from 0% to 28.2%.
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when banks are allowed to print their own money (compare columns 3 and 4). We also notice
that inside money increases welfare by a larger amount in the economy with low ¯ r.I n s i d e
money plays a less prominent role in the economy with ¯ r = 4 because liquidity is less scarce
than when ¯ r =1 .W h e nb a n k sa r eb o r nw i t hf o u ru n i t so fr e s e r v e s ,t h e yh a v ea ne a s i e rt i m e
printing money. This, in turn, has positive external eﬀects on other banks that can now
accumulate reserves more easily. Because the value of being a bank, relative to a nonbank,
is quite large in this economy, banks behave more conservatively, and the fraction of illiquid
banks is only 3.5% (instead of 18.6 %i nt h ec a s ew h e r e¯ r =1 ) .O u rﬁndings illustrate that
inside money plays an important role when liquidity is scarce; an observation that we believe
is consistent with some historical episodes.21
21See Hanson (1979) and Cuadras-Morato and Ros´ es (1998).
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¯ r =1 ¯ r =4
Reserve Regulation Outside M. InsideM. Outside M. Inside M.
Avg. nonbank welfare 3.13 4.31 4.35 4.51
Avg. bank welfare 3.95 6.10 7.08 7.61
pn
1/pn
0 .200 .319 .314 .335
Number of banks .10 0.085 .10 .0978
Fraction illiquid banks 0% 18.6% 0% 3.5%
Fraction exiting banks 0% 1.71% 0% .22%
Share of private money 48.7% 64.0% 64.2% 65.8%
Share of inside money 0% 28.2% 0% 5.5%
4.5 Increasing entry into the banking sector
One question is to what extent redemption disciplines the issue of money by the banking
sector. We address this question by increasing competition for reserves through an increase
in banking entry. To this end, we ﬁx µn = .1 and compare three economies that diﬀer in
the fraction of the newborn agents that are banks (µb = .1,.5,.90). Table 5 shows that as
the fraction of banks in the population increases from .1t o.90, the probability that a unit
of money in circulation is redeemed increases from .126 to .367. It should be noted that
the speed at which notes are reﬂuxed is determined by aggregate forces (and not just the
number of banks). In our economy, the central bank together with the rule that shuts down
banks with negative reserves, is quite eﬀective in disciplining banks. Because banks strive
to accumulate reserves for supporting issue, the redemption probability increases with the
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and 12 compare banks’ decision rules when µb = .1a n dµb = .5. When µb = .5, banks
prefer not to issue money whenever the prospects of excessive redemptions put them at risk
of being closed down. In this economy, there is no illiquid banking. The reﬂux of notes is
thus a strong force disciplining banks.
Table 5 demonstrates that welfare for both banks and nonbanks (across the three ex-
amples considered) improves with the number of banks. A larger fraction of banks leads
to an increase in liquidity, which makes both banks and nonbanks better oﬀ.W e l f a r e i s
the largest in the economy with the smallest aggregate stock of money, which suggests once
again that choosing an appropriate notion of liquidity, in an economy with inside money, is
a non-trivial matter. In our model, the welfare of the society depends on both the measure
of people willing to produce, p, as well as that willing to consume, q, in a multiplicative
way: p×q (the product is a measure of the frequency of successful trades). In equilibrium,
p = pn
0 + pb · γ represents how easily a consumer can spend a note, and q = pn
1 + pb · φ
n
represents how easily a producer can earn a note. The dependence on the product p × q
demonstrates that liquidity is not suﬃciently summarized by the money stock. The amount
of money that is created and destroyed is also relevant.
While the number of potential banks is our model is exogenous, one could model free
entry in the following way. Suppose, in the spirit of HHW, that in each period there is an
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ﬁxed cost of setting up a communication network with the central bank (e.g., creating a
bank involves a resource cost in general goods). Then, we could consider an economy where
there is free entry into the banking industry. Individuals would be willing to pay (in units of
t h eg e n e r a lg o o d )a na m o u n tt h a tw o u l dm a k et h e mi n d i ﬀerent between being a banker or
not. We conjecture that, under certain parameter conﬁgurations, a stable monetary system
will arise in which banks do not make ex-ante proﬁts. Once banks pay the lump-sum fee,
they face a reserve-management problem that, as before, provides incentives to accumulate
reserves and to control note issue.
Table 5: Chartering more banks
Fraction of newborn banks .10 .50 .90
Redemption probability .126 .25 .367
Avg. nonbank welfare 4.31 5.86 7.50
Avg bank welfare 6.10 8.90 11.92
pn
1/pn
0 .319 .468 1.0
Number of banks 0.085 .50 .90
Fraction of illiquid banks 18.6% 0% 0%
Fraction of exiting banks 1.71% 0% 0%
Share of private money 64.0% 75%
Share of inside money 28.2% 0%
Aggregate money stock .221 .159 .0499
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We have presented, in this paper, an extension of earlier work, using it this time to discuss
fundamental central-bank policies, comparing improvements in the provision of liquidity with
risks of bank failure. The core idea is that bank liabilities are used as media of exchange and
become, as a result, a source of ﬁnancing for real activities. In our model, banks issue notes
in payment for consumption, but a literal interpretation of this exchange can underestimate
the generality of our results. One could view a bank, at a particular date in our model, as
a coalition between a productive enterprise and a ﬁnancial institution, so that the liabilities
of the pair constitute a device for ﬁnancing productive investments, in the same way that
bills of exchange were seen in monetary history. The fact that these liabilities are eventually
redeemed gives real value to these promises. We have emphasized the role of banking returns
and of aggregate liquidity conditions governing banking activity.
We believe that outside-money models in general, and Walrasian models with simple
monetary aggregates in particular, are not likely to generate the kind of diverse phenomena
observed in monetary history. In certain historic episodes, private banks have been fairly
described as inherently unstable. One challenge is to build models in which banking adversi-
ties receive serious consideration while, at the same time, banks identify liquidity needs and
promote decentralized trade. It should not be surprising that models capable of generating
such diversity do so at the cost of some complexity. We recognize that our model is not
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paper. But we also believe that our model is built on sound foundations and that it addresses
some of the concerns, expressed in the Kareken and Wallace (1980) volume, regarding the
lack of models of media of exchange and privately-provided liquidity. Banks in our model
are simply agents that can be monitored to some extent, and desirable institutions should
emerge to make use of their capacity to create inside money and wealth. This is a basic but
fruitful view of the role of banks. However, modeling the coexistence of credit and money
h a sa l w a y sb e e nd i ﬃcult.
Early monetary theorists emphasized that competition in money provision could create
a stabilizing eﬀect through the reduction in the ﬂoat of private money. They termed this
eﬀect the Law of Reﬂux.22 Our model ﬁts this emphasis well. We have also discussed how
interest payments on reserves may induce a concern by banks regarding reserve manage-
ment. We have shown that a monetary economy with ﬂoat of private notes can, under some
assumptions, be duplicated by an outside-money economy without ﬂoat. When banks can
create money, however, there is a welfare gain that bank regulation can exploit. If banks are
perfectly monitored, an optimal regulation may remove their concern about reserves. The
literature review motivated our assumption of a ﬁxed clearing system, according to which
22Adams Smith’s classic suggestions that notes should be uniform and have a minimum denomination can
be interpreted as proposals that enhance reﬂux, making liabilities more marketable. Thus, the Real Bills
Doctrine can be related to the Law of Reﬂux, in the sense that it must hold in general equilibrium conditions
giving “real” value to the liabilities issued.
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Thus, inside money under imperfect monitoring may lead to some bank failure.
In our model, banks can be proﬁtable without earning interests on reserves, since the ca-
pability to create liquidity has private beneﬁts. We have studied whether a stable monetary
system emerges, as well as whether there is underissue or overissue of notes, and whether
some infusion of reserves or an interest payment on reserves by the central bank can re-
duce monetary instability. The answers proved to be non-trivial, and the model displayed
important nonlinearities and general-equilibrium eﬀects. We have showed that banks may
underissue if trading with other banks results in excessive redemptions. Small increases on
interest rates paid on reserves may reduce banking returns and increase risk-taking. Larger
interest rates may produce an outside-money economy, with worsened nonbank welfare. In
other cases, banks willingly cross a threshold in their reserve-management policy and start
overissuing until failure. In summary, monetary stability depends on central-bank polices
and liquidity conditions in general. Allowing banks to run some negative reserves, which re-
sembles a central-bank policy of reserve lending, may facilitate reserve management, increase
returns, and promote trade and ﬁnancial stability with a lower rate of bank failure.
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Here we formally describe the mapping Tγ,φb,φn governing the law of motion of (pn,p b).






k, the mapping is given by the right side of the
equations below, together with the expressions from the equilibrium deﬁnition relating pb,
pn,a n dπ to (γ,φ
n,φ
b). For nonbanks, we have
p
n






















(1 − µc − µb),
where p = pn
0 + pb · γ and q = pn
1 + pb · φ
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for all r0,m 0 ≥ 0, where qb = pn
1 + pb · φ
b,a n dIr0,m0 is an indicator function that assumes
value one if (r0,m 0)=( ¯ r,0) and value zero otherwise.
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w
j
r,m = rR + βv
b
r,m − βKf(m − j)
where f(m) denotes the mean of the binomial distribution on {0,1,...,m} with parameter π.






r,i + a1i − a2[f(m + i) − f(m)]
where a1 and a2 are constants. Since the mean f(m) of a binomial distribution is linear in
m, the stated linearity of vb follows. The uniqueness of a solution vb, given (φ,γ), follows
from the fact that the Bellman equation for banks satisﬁes the monotonicity and discounting
properties, Blackwell’s condition for a contraction. The fact that A is positive follows from
the fact that R is positive and from the implied values for a1 and a2.
Proof of Proposition 2: Allowing for swaps only adds a constant to bank values in the
ﬂoat economy. Hence we can ignore swaps and write, without loss of generality, the Bellman


















By Proposition 1, vb
r,1 − vb
r−1,0 is equal to a constant that does not depend on r.I t i s
clear, by the deﬁnition of ¯ R,t h a t¯ R = βvb
r,1 − βvb
r−1,0 must hold. The result thus follows
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r,1 = vb
r−1,0 + ¯ R/β above and by setting vb
g = vb
g,0 to obtain the Bellman
equation of the economy without ﬂoat.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 : The proof is a straightforward version, in discrete time, of the
arguments in Wright (1999), and is thus omitted.
Proof of Lemma 2: We ﬁx R =0a n dﬁrst demonstrate that vb is weakly increasing in
r.L e t G = {f : N+ × N+ → R}. Deﬁne the operator T : G → G as the right hand side
of the functional equation for a bank. We know that T has a unique ﬁxed point, vb,i n
the space of bounded continuous functions. If T also maps the space of weakly increasing
continuous functions into itself, and since this space is complete, this ﬁxed point will also
be a weakly increasing continuous function. We need to show T preserves monotonicity,
i.e., for any ﬁxed m, r1 ≤ r2 implies that Tvb(r1,m) ≤ Tvb(r2,m). We ﬁrst show that for
all m and any j, wj
r1,m ≤ wj








rh−i,m+j−i, where h =1 ,2. Notice that the terms multiplying vb
are the same for h =1 ,2. Since vb is monotone, it follows that wj
r,m is monotone. Next,

















Note that the ﬁrst r1 terms in the ﬁrst sum are weakly greater when rh = r2 than when
rh = r1,g i v e nt h a tv is monotonically increasing in r. The result then follows since, for all
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r,m >v n
1. By the same reasoning, the desired inequality follows for the case where
r1 <m<r 2,s i n c evb is monotonically increasing in r and, for all (r,m), vb
r,m >v n
1.
Now we show that vb is weakly decreasing in m. Applying the same reasoning we need to show
that for any ﬁxed r, m1 ≤ m2 implies that Tvb(r,m1) ≥ Tvb(r,m2). Like before, we ﬁrst show
that for all r and any j, wj
r,m1 ≥ wj



























1−p. This expression is less than one
if and only if i>p (m + 1). Therefore, p(i,m) is greater than p(i,m +1 )f o rl o wv a l u e so f
i and is lower than p(i,m + 1) for high values of i. The result then follows since wj
r,m is a
convex combination of decreasing functions of m.T h e r e f o r e ,wj
r,m1 ≥ wj
r,m2.S i n c evb
r,m >v n
1,
the same argument can be used to demonstrate the result both when r<m 1 and when
m1 <r<m 2.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 :The ﬁrst inequality clearly holds. Regarding the second inequality,
since vb is increasing in r and decreasing in m,i ti ss u ﬃcient to show that vb
0,m >v n
1,f o rm
large. In this case, the bank will have a negative balance with probability 1 at the end of the
period and will thus exit the sector. If it issues one more unit of money this period, in the




even for arbitrarily high m.
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(First part). The proof follows by contradiction. Assume that there is an optimal policy
(φ
n,φ
b,γ) such that φ
n
r0,m0 = 0 for some state (r0,m 0)w i t hr0 >m 0. Consider a bank that
is in state (r0,m 0). Notice that this bank decides not to issue a note in the current period.
Also, notice that this decision would only be optimal if the bank could reach with positive
probability in the future a state where it will issue a note (otherwise, the bank would trivially
increase utility by consuming today instead of not consuming forever). Denote this state




, ˆ γ) that gives a strictly higher
expected discounted utility to the bank than policy (φ
n,φ
b,γ), contradicting the optimality
of (φ
n,φ




, ˆ γ), it is convenient to expand the
state space to include two new artiﬁcial state variables, representing artiﬁcial reserves ra
and notes ma. Initialize the current (expanded) state as (r,m,ra,m a)=( r0,m 0,r 0,m 0). Set
ˆ φr0,m0,r0,m0 = 1 and, immediately after the note is issued, let the expanded state variable
become (r,m,ra,m a)=( r0,m 0+1,r 0,m 0). From now on, update ra and ma in the same way
as r and m but with the following exception: If the note just issued in state (r0,m 0,r 0,m 0)i s
redeemed, do not count this redemption in the state for artiﬁcial reserves and notes (that is,








ra,maˆ γr,m,ra,ma = γra,ma
23Obviously, since no new notes were issued before reaching state (r1,m 1), it should be the case that
r1 >m 1 for all possible histories of redemptions and production decisions.
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(r1,m 1) that can be reached with positive probability and where φ
n
r1,m1 = 1. When such a
state is reached for the ﬁrst time, set ˆ φ
n
r1,m1,ra,ma = 0 and change the law of motion for the
artiﬁcial state to allow the note that would have just been issued under the original policy in
state (r1,m 1) (but that in fact was issued some periods ago under the alternative policy) to
be redeemed with probability π (this is an artiﬁcial redemption since the original note could





,ˆ γ). Now we contradict the optimality of (φ
n,φ
b,γ) by noting the following:
1. Under the alternative policy, the bank consumes today (when the bank is in state
(r0,m 0)), rather than at some point in the future when the state (r1,m 1) is reached.
2. Consumption and production decisions are the same while the bank transits from
(r0,m 0)t o( r1,m 1). Because, r0 >m 0 and r1 >m 1 (see last footnote), the bank does





3. Once state (r1,m 1) is reached, the stochastic process for (r,m) induced by the redemp-
tion process and policy (φ
n,φ
b,γ) is the same stochastic process for (ra,m a) induced
by the modiﬁed redemption process (considering the artiﬁcial redemption for the note
issued in state (r0,m0)). As a result, the consumption and production decisions implied
by the two policies coincide.
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, ˆ γ) gives higher utility, contra-
dicting that (φ
n,φ
b,γ)i so p t i m a l .
(Second part). Consider a bank facing an opportunity to increase reserves. We have that
γr,m =0i fa n do n l yi f−e + w0
r+1,m ≤ w0
r,m. Note that w0
r,m is bounded, since it belongs to
the interval (0, u
1−β). It is also an increasing function of r. Therefore, for ﬁxed m,w eh a v e
limr→∞ w0
r,m =l i m r→∞ w0
r−1,m = Km. The result then follows for r large.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :C o n s i d e rt h ec a s ew h e r em = r,w h e r er is large. We have
that φ
n
r,r =1i fa n do n l yi fu + w1
r,r+1 >w 0
r,r.N o t i c et h a tw0
r,r is bounded, since it belongs
to the interval (0, u
1−β). It is also an increasing function of r. Therefore, limr→∞ w0
r,r =
limr→∞ w0





r,r =l i m r→∞ w0
r,r+1 = limr→∞w1
r,r+1 = K. Thus, the above inequality follows
for r large.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 :A bank that is given the opportunity to issue a note to a nonbank


































Figure 1: Phase Diagram






= limm→∞ πi(1 − π)m−i =0 .
Thus, limm→∞ wj








1,a n d ,f o ra n yﬁxed r,t h e r e
exists an mr large enough such that u + βvn
1 > βvn
1 and, therefore, φ
n
r,m =1 .W ek n o wt h a t
γr,m =0i fa n do n l yi f−e+w0
r+1,m ≤ w0





1. Therefore, given r, there exists a large enough mr such that −e +
βw0
r+1,m = −e + βvn
1 < βvn
1 = βw0
r,m,f o rm ≥ mr. Therefore, γr,m =0f o ra l lm ≥ mr.
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Figure 2: Values of γr,m in the Benchmark Economy


















































































































































































































r,m in the Benchmark Economy
86
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 394




























































































































































































































Figure 4: Values of γr,m in the Economies with R =0a n dR = .02
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r,m in the Economies with R =0a n dR = .02
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Figure 6: Values of γr,m in the Economies with R =0a n dR = .002
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Figure 8: Values of γr,m in the Economies with ¯ r =2a n d¯ r =4
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Figure 11: Values of γr,m in the Economies with µb = .1a n dµb = .5
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